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TAKING LAW AND SOCIETY SERIOUSLY
LAWRENCE

M. FRIEDMAN*

This symposium is called "Taking Legal Argument Seriously."
The question that comes immediately to mind is this: Should we take
legal argument seriously? There are a number of reasons why we
might want to do so. One is that, as Richard Markovits argues, good
legal argument leads to correct legal answers.' Who could be against
correct answers? But this position assumes that there are, in fact, legal
answers that can be described as "correct." I will leave this line of
reasoning alone. I have to confess that I am one of the skeptics. For
borderline and difficult questions, I doubt that there is such a thing as
a "correct" legal answer, even from the "internal" standpoint.
Moreover, suppose we concede that there are "correct" answers:
Why should most of us be interested? "Internally" correct means
correct in strictly "legal" terms. 2 But why should that be significant?
Law from the internal perspective is comparable to a system of
theology. If you do not believe in the basic premises of the religion,
you are unlikely to care whether there is such a thing as a "correct"
answer to a theological question within that religion. A theologian
might argue that "correct" had a concrete, valid meaning within the
system of the religion, but an outsider would not particularly care
what that "correct" answer was. For those of us who think that law is
a political, economic, and cultural subsystem, which varies with, and is
determined by, the surrounding society, the "internalist" point of
view is perhaps sociologically interesting-but nothing more. It
certainly has no independent moral power.
On the other hand, we might find legal argument important and
worthy of attention for other reasons. We might take it seriously
because we think legal argument has a significant impact on society or
on some party of society. Most lawyers certainly feel that good legal
argument influences the way judges decide cases. This is no minor
* Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor, Stanford University School of Law.
1. See Richard S. Markovits, Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to
Legal-Rights Questions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415 (1999).
2. See id. at 417-20.
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matter. Legal argument might perhaps affect the behavior of other
actors as well. The actual impact on anybody of any particular legal
argument is, in my view, an empirical question, and we do not really
know the answer. Obviously, legal argument must have some impact
on judges, but how much is a mystery. It could, in fact, be extremely
small. Moreover, whatever the impact is, it is likely to be socially
quite variable. Argument might make a difference in some contexts
and not in others. In highly charged contexts, the impact is likely to
be negligible. I doubt, for example, that anybody in Congress took the
legal arguments very seriously in the controversy over President
Clinton's impeachment. People said they did, but somehow I was not
convinced. As far as behavior is concerned, I saw no evidence that
any legal argument-no matter how clever-changed anybody's
mind, once the matter had gotten to a particular stage of heat. Of
course, this was an intensely political process. The type of situation
obviously matters. A judge might pay a lot of attention to strictly
legal argument in an intricate tax law case, and very little in a case on
abortion rights. Or it might go the other way around.
Legal argument reaches judges in various ways. It can reach
them explicitly in briefs and oral arguments. It can reach them
implicitly through training and socialization, or through legal
literature, or even through the popular press. The impact of legal
argument on judges is not readily measurable. We know what judges
say in their opinions, but judicial opinions are stylized and traditionbound. They do not necessarily reflect what the judges were actually
thinking. In fact, we have no way of reading the minds of judges any
more than we can read the minds of carpenters or police officers. I
doubt whether judges are always able to read their own minds. Few of
us really can.
We do know that some legal arguments are likely to end up in
judicial opinions-others are likely to end up in the trash can or to
appear in opinions only to be laughed at or discarded. Hence, a good
legal argument might be defined objectively as an argument that
judges treat with respect. Such an argument may not actually change
the minds of judges, but at least they have to handle it with care.
What kinds of arguments get treated with respect? This is, again,
an empirical question, and I do not know offhand of many studies
that try to give an answer. 3 In principle, however, answers are
3. For one of the few examples of studies that attempt to provide an answer, see generally
Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
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definitely possible. What seems abundantly clear is that the answers
will vary from society to society and from time period to time period.
Imagine what Rufus Peckham, who wrote the majority opinion in
Lochner v. New York, 4 would have thought of the argument that
people have some sort of constitutional right to buy contraceptives or
that women have a right to get an abortion.5 For that matter, what
would Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., or his ghost, think of these
arguments?
Up to now I have talked about judges. Whether legal argument
has an effect on anybody outside the circle of judges is even more
dubious. Legal argument may have an effect on opinion in the
academy. Law professors are always talking about good opinions and
weak opinions and so on. Is this important in society at large?
Probably not. For its part, the wider public is mostly unaware of legal
arguments. The public knows about the results of a handful of
important cases, but not about how those results came about. How
many of the people who are passionate on either side of the abortion
issue have the slightest notion of the legal arguments for or against?
Not one in a thousand, I would guess.
There is, of course, a kind of trickle-down theory of legal
argument. The public may not know anything about these arguments,
but the legal academy does, or the elites do, or other judges do. Their
views ultimately filter into middle-brow journals, Time Magazine,
television talk shows, and so on. Somehow, then, in the course of
time, academic judgments about whether this or that argument makes
sense come to have an impact on the thoughts and behavior of the
general public or some significant part of it. This is certainly possible;
but, again, it is an empirical question. Does this trickle-down process
actually take place? In fact, there is little or no evidence to support it.
My own hunch is that there is nothing to the argument at all.
Take, for example, Brown v. Board of Education.6 Nobody dares
attack the decision anymore-but there have been plenty of scholars
who carp at the opinion. In the early years, these came mostly from
right-wing white Southerners, who hated the decision, or from
conservative jurists who found the case too daring, too frightening.
But even some liberals, who liked the result, deplored what they saw
JudicialReasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377 (1998).
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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as Warren's ineptitude. 7 One went so far as to draft a different and
presumably better opinion. 8 More recently, some of the complaining
comes from the left. According to one critic, Warren adopted bad
theories, which ultimately helped derail the whole civil rights
movement; the case, he thought, served to "deaden political debate
and to legitimate the status quo."9
I have little sympathy for these propositions. For one thing, they
have no real evidence to back them up.10 And they are profoundly
implausible. Common sense tells us they simply cannot be right. Do
we really think that a more powerfully argued or crafted opinion in
Brown would have changed the minds of white supremacists in
Mississippi or Alabama? The question answers itself.
I hate to be raining on the parade, but my view, in brief, is that
formal legal argument as such probably does not make much of a
difference in the world. I am not saying that decisions make no
difference; in many cases they do. I am making a distinction between
the result of a case-what it decides and how it decides it-and the
reasoning that supports the result. To be sure, there are no pure
"results." Some argument, theory, or conception is implicit even in
the barest per curiam decision. People certainly understood that
Brown was not just telling Topeka to let black students into all-white
schools; the Court was obviously saying something more, something
bigger, about race relations and the law. But the precise "legal"
arguments that led to the result of the case probably made very little
difference to the way the public understood those results.
Consequently, the arguments were not much of an element in
determining the impact of the case in real life. At least that is what I
believe. There is not much proof on either side of this question.
In any society, of course, there are such things as strong
arguments and weak arguments. The question is: Where do these
judgments about strong and weak come from? Clearly, there are
reasons why certain arguments seem powerful at particular times in
7. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Brown in Context, in RACE, LAW, AND CULTURE:
REFLECTIONS ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 49 (Austin Sarat ed., 1997).
8. See generally Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discriminationand Judicial Integrity: A Reply to
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24-30 (1959).
9. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 715 (1992); see also
J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 46 (1979).
10. Quite a different issue, of course, is the issue of the actual impact of Brown on
segregation itself. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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history (and in particular places). These reasons are significant. The
late nineteenth-century judges appeared to take seriously arguments
about liberty of contract, employers' rights, limitations on the power
of the federal government, and so on, in cases like Lochner v. New
York"; most of these arguments today are, on the whole, totally out
of fashion. On the other hand, nineteenth-century judges brushed off
almost cavalierly arguments about the illegality of what we would
today call sex discrimination." Legal argument, then, precisely
because it is so socially variable, can be an interesting and valuable
indicator of trends and values in a society. Research on this subject,
too, is in drastically short supply.
Professor Markovits's thesis, as I understand it, also assumes that
there is a more or less clear line between a "legal" argument and
(say) a "policy" argument. I think in practice such a line hardly exists.
Certainly not today. Legal systems in our modern world are
enormously complicated. There are tons of statutes, rules and
regulations, court decisions, and the like, at federal, state, and local
levels. It is impossible to think of a policy argument that could not be
grounded, explicitly or implicitly, in some purely "legal" premises.
This is especially true of close cases, border-line cases, cases fraught
with social consequences, and so on.
What does it mean, then, to talk about "legal" premises and
"internally-correct" arguments? I am not entirely sure; but there
seems to be a distinction here which more or less tracks Max Weber's
famous distinction between formal and substantive rationality.13
Formal rationality, for Weber, was reasoning where "the legally
relevant characteristics" of facts were "disclosed through the logical
analysis of meaning"; formally rational systems used "fixed legal
concepts" and "highly abstract rules.' 1 4 Substantive rationality
"accords predominance" to "ethical imperatives, utilitarian and other
expediential rules."' 5 Formal rationality was, in short, "legalistic."
Substantive rationality was more open-textured-it was more open to
considerations of "policy."
I think the distinction was always somewhat shaky. Even shakier
is the assumption that formal rationality ever represented anything
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12. One of the classic examples is Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
13. See MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 61-64 (Max
Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954)
14. Id. at 63.
15. Id.
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more than a style of writing about law. I suspect that there was much
less formal rationality, in fact, in the nineteenth century, in Germany
and elsewhere, than Weber thought. He may have confused style with
substance-in the codes and in opinion writing. But this again is a
difficult matter to resolve. Weber himself talked about "antiformalistic" tendencies in the law of his day.16 These tendencies have
become much stronger over the years. They may well be the
inevitable result of more democracy and the development of the
welfare-regulatory state.
I. LEGAL ARGUMENT IN CONTEXT
It seems perfectly obvious that social context determines what
legal arguments will be used and which ones will strike judges and
others as persuasive. Can we say anything more specific than this
about the relationship between legal argument and social context?
To begin with, we have to ask why there is such a thing as legal
reasoning or legal argument at all. There are alternatives: legal
decisions which are not supported by overt reasoning. Judges could,
for example, simply toss a coin. Or they could hand down decisions
without written opinions. Jury verdicts are decisions that are
completely bare of reasoning or argument of any kind. 7 Nor do
legislatures, ordinarily, decorate the laws they pass with a chain of
reasoning. Once in a while there is a preamble giving excuses or even
reasons. But on the whole, statutes simply lay down the law. Indeed,
they are the law.
How do we explain why some decision-makers must give reasons
and why others need not? One key fact is the source of the legitimacy
of the decision-maker. I use the term "legitimate" here in an
empirical sense, rather than a normative sense. Authority is
legitimate if the public, or some relevant part of it, thinks the
8
authority is legitimate.
There are all sorts of legitimate authorities in various societies.
Legitimacy is either ultimate or derivative.19 Ultimate authority does

16. See id. at 303.
17. The jury is, therefore, in Weberian terms, irrational, since its deliberations and results
are unpredictable in a way that a well-reasoned legal decision (of the formally rational sort) is
(theoretically) not.
18. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
19. On the distinctions that follow, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYsTEM: A
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 236-37 (1975).
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not have to give reasons: within its society, it is self-legitimating.2 0 In a
sacred law system, which claims that it rests on divine revelation,
nobody has to give a reason for a rule or a command that God lays
down. The Ten Commandments came into the world as naked fiat.
There is probably some form of ultimate authority in every system. In
a parliamentary democracy, Parliament passes laws which are as
devoid of supporting argument as a jury verdict or the Ten
Commandments. This is because Parliament is supposed to represent
what the people want; and what the people want is an ultimate
authority. A jury verdict itself needs no overt reasons, in part at least
because it too represents some sort of popular will.
Derivative authority is not legitimate in itself-not in the way of
ultimate authority. Derivative authority has to do something to link
its actions to some higher authority, and in the end the chain of
justification has to connect with some ultimate authority.',
Intermediate links can be quite simple and obvious. A police officer
wears a uniform as a sign of his authority. The officer gets a search
warrant before entering a house. The uniform and badge show that
the officer has been empowered to direct traffic, arrest people, or
break up a fight. The officer's authority comes from the city, the city's
comes from the state, and there is some "law" that lies behind it all.
The warrant links the officer to the judge, who in turn is linked to
legitimate law.
Legal reasoning is another linkage device. It connects the legal
acts of a judge to some higher or ultimate authority. Judges, after all,
have only derivative authority in our system and in most systems.
Judges and justices do not (in legal theory) have the power to make
law on their own-or at least not as blatantly as the legislature.
Whatever they decide they must connect to something higher up: to
the Constitution, or to an act of the legislature, or to principles of the
common law, or (at times) to "natural justice." A judge's say-so is
simply not enough.
Legal reasoning is a method (though not the only method) of
making this link. The judges present arguments to show how their
result is justified and to connect it with some higher act of authority.
Their arguments are, for the most part, grounded in what is
conventionally defined as "law." In our own period, judges are
somewhat more likely to throw in references to other kinds of
20. See id. at 236.
21. See id. at 236-37.
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authority including ethical, economic, or social norms. 22 This may be
nothing more than a stylistic shift or it may be a real movement in the
direction of more substantive rationality. It is hard to tell.
Different societies have different forms of linkage-different
ways of legal reasoning, different canons for judging argument. A lot
depends on the system of primary legitimacy. Some systems do, and
some do not, separate "legal" from nonlegal reasons. I call a legal
system closed when an ideology of legalism dominates its legal
culture-an ideology that insists that only "legal" premises can be
used to construct an argument. An open system, on the other hand,
does not distinguish between "legal" propositions and arguments and
other kinds of premises and principles. Again, some legal systems
admit innovation-they expect the legal system to change, which
means that they consider it entirely possible for new legal premises to
be born. Other systems, on the other hand, are in theory timeless and
unchanging. If we join these two distinctions, we get four types of
legal systems and to these four types there correspond four types of
legal reasoning. I will briefly describe the four types. Needless to say,
in the real world almost no legal system and no system of legal
reasoning fits precisely and without exception into any of the four
boxes.
First, one can imagine a legal system which is closed and which
also denies the possibility of innovation. What kind of system would
this be? One could conceive of a sacred law system with a single
sacred book, which (in theory) has everything in it. All legal decisions
have to be painfully extracted from this single text. As the centuries
roll by, the task becomes more and more difficult. Legal reasoning,
therefore, becomes mystical and arcane, at times focussing on tiny
verbal distinctions or indulging in flights of "Talmudic" fancy. Legal
fictions abound, and reasoning by analogy becomes highly developed.
Classical Jewish and Islamic law had elements of this kind of
system. So too, in a way, did the common law system at some points
in its history. True, there was no sacred text; but there was an
ideology which, on the whole, was hostile to rank innovation. In
theory, too, the canon of premises was more closed than open-the
doctrine of stare decisis was a doctrine of fixity. Extreme formalismthe "mechanical" jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century, a kind
of crabbed, dry logic-chopping, was one possible result. Late
22. See Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 817 (1981).
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nineteenth-century common law jurisprudence, to be sure, also had
elements of other types of systems, including the one next to be
mentioned.
The second type, where the canon is closed but innovation is
accepted, may seem logically impossible. But there are indeed
systems which are not entirely dissimilar. These are the systems which
believe in "legal science." In the short run, there is a fixed canon of
premises, but jurists can "discover" new propositions, improve old
ones, and develop more and more refined legal concepts, as legal
science progresses. The continental systems have something of this
flavor. The codes are not sacred; the legislatures can (and do) amend
them. But in the short run, the judges cannot add or subtract from the
text; yet they, and the jurists who write commentaries, can learn new
truths about legal principles and about the principles embodied in the
codes as their "science" becomes more advanced. Late nineteenthcentury common law jurisprudence, in the age of Langdell, shared
some of these traits.
Customary law systems are more or less examples of the third
type of system. In many customary systems, people think the law is
old, traditional, immutable, changeless. There is no obvious way to
"legislate." On the other hand, in preliterate systems, there are no
codes, lawyers, or written texts; hence, there are no strictly "legal"
propositions. Judges and elders draw on custom, experience, common
sense, and morality-any norms that are reasonable and accepted.
These systems were not, in fact, changeless. But changes took place at
a fairly slow pace and the process was relatively unconscious.
The fourth type of system is one where the canon of premises is
wide open and innovation is accepted, even welcomed. We can call
these instrumentalsystems. In this category, we can put some of the
revolutionary systems of law-the law of the Soviet Union, for
example, in the early days of the Revolution or the law of China
under Mao. Sweeping orthodox legalism aside, these systems allowed
decisions to be made on the basis of revolutionary principles. This is
also where we would place those systems which are, in Max Weber's
terms, substantively rational. These would be systems which welcome
arguments based on "policy" or "economic efficiency." Certainly,
most legislatures, most of the time, operate as instrumental systems.
In short, styles of reasoning and argument do not fall from the
sky; they are closely tied to ruling constructs in a society or within a
legal culture -particularly concepts of legitimacy. What is true of
whole legal systems is also true of subsystems: forms of legitimacy and
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types of argument are different in legislatures compared to courts. A
religious court in a sacred law system might reason in a highly
casuistical manner; a charismatic leader, in the same system, might
simply rule by decree. An American judge is not supposed to make
law; of course, we all know that they do make law, but they make
only certain kinds of law, and they disguise what they are doing with
certain well-known figleaves. A legislature, on the other hand, is
perfectly free to make law, in great detail and specificity. Making law
is what legislatures do.
All these remarks relate to the form or type of legal argument.
As I said, real-life systems are very complicated, especially today, and
resist being squeezed into one particular box. American law perhaps
has elements of all four of the types mentioned. These forms and
styles are, obviously, not politically or socially neutral. Some
twentieth-century observers think that American judges have become
less formalistic than they were in the late nineteenth century; and that
in that period they were more formalistic than they were in the early
nineteenth century. 23 Why the changes? One suggestion-and it is
only a suggestion-is that formalism in the age of Lochner and
substantive due process was a convenient disguise, a camouflage. The
judges were fighting an ideological, political, and economic battle.
They were resisting socialism and paternalism, as they saw it. They
were hostile to organized labor. The judges covered their
conservative opinions with a figleaf of legalism.
This suggestion, I think, has more than a grain of truth but reality
was undoubtedly far more ragged and complex. The point here is
simply that styles and forms of argument are socially determined. In
each instance, we have to ask, why this style, why this form, what did
it mean, and to whom? What did it accomplish, and for whom? The
content or substance of legal argument is also socially determinedand politically meaningful. That much is perfectly obvious. As I
suggested, you can imagine how a nineteenth-century judge would
react to the wilder sorts of argument about due process or equal
protection or freedom of speech that are absolutely standard today.
Freedom of speech, according to the Supreme Court, puts its mantle
of protection around somebody who burns the American flag as a
protest.2 4 State supreme courts have struck down sodomy statutes as
23. Notably, see Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or CanonsAbout How Statutes Are to Be Construed,3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
24. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). See generally ROBERT J. GOLDSTEIN,
BURNING THE FLAG: THE GREAT 1989-1990 AMERICAN FLAG DESECRATION CONTROVERSY
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violations of fundamental rights. 25 The Supreme Court came within a
26
hair of doing so itself.
On the other side, highly technical arguments, or arguments
based on legal fiction, are probably somewhat suspect today and are
unlikely to make much of an impression on judges-even if a lawyer
were so foolish as to pursue this kind of argument. Courts get a
drubbing from the public (and from politicians) for letting dangerous
criminals loose on "technicalities." Of course, statements like this are
usually based on bias or ignorance, but they tap into a distaste for
"technicality," which is widely shared among members of the public.
II. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND LEGAL EDUCATION
The Introduction to this symposium posed a number of questions
which the participants were invited to address.2 7 I have dodged or
avoided most of them. But I do want to add a few comments about
legal education and its history. Professor Markovits thinks that law
professors have been paying less and less attention to legal
argument.2 8 He believes there has been a shift from teaching students
'29
"thinking like a lawyer" to teaching "manipulating like a lawyer.
He also thinks scholars have, increasingly, tried to "smuggle various
kinds of personal values ... into their legal analyses. 30° He is afraid
these trends in scholarship and teaching have had a bad effect on
lawyering and judging.
I read the history somewhat differently. To begin with, I see little
or no difference between "thinking like a lawyer" and "manipulating
like a lawyer." C.C. Langdell, who brought the case method to
31
Harvard, thought there was such a thing as a correct legal answer.
Langdell claimed that law was a science which rested on a few broad,
basic principles. These were apparently timeless and value-neutral.
(1996).
25. The most recent example is from Georgia, in Powell v. State, No. $98AO755, 1998 WL
878550 (Ga. Nov. 23, 1998). The court said, among other things: "We cannot think of any other
activity that reasonable persons would rank as more private and more deserving of protection
from governmental interference than unforced, private, adult sexual activity." Id. at *4.
26. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-89 (1986), a five to four decision. Ironically,
this case upheld the very Georgia statute that the Georgia court struck down twelve years later.
See Powell, 1998 WL 878550, at *6.
27. See Richard S. Markovits, Taking Legal Argument Seriously: An Intoduction, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 317 (1999).
28. See Markovits, supra note 1, at 461-63.
29. Id. at 462.
30. Markovits, supra note 27, at 322.
31. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITr. L. REV. 1 (1983).
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Students were supposed to learn these principles, through Socratic
osmosis, and use them to derive right answers to legal questions.
Langdell's method-the Harvard method-was unpopular at
first, but ultimately it spread to school after school and blew away all
the rival methods. Why this occurred, what the attraction was, and
what connection "legal science" had, if any, with capitalist expansion
or any other trend in the larger society, are difficult and murky
questions. 32 By the 1920s or so, the case-method had legal education
almost all to itself.33 Yet many legal scholars had fallen away from
Langdell's faith. They no longer believed in his kind of "legal
science." But if this was the case, what was the point of Langdell's
methods? Exactly what were students learning in the classrooms and
why were they learning it?
To answer these questions, legal educators repackaged legal
education as skills training. Law school taught you not the principles
of the science of law-certainly not the law itself-but how to think
like a lawyer. Law, as Alfred Z. Reed put it, was a "thicket, ... [and

the] young practitioner [was to be] equipped with a trained mind,
[which, like] a trusty axe, [gave him the ability] to spend the rest of his
life chopping his way through the tangle. 34
Of course, all this chopping and hacking had nothing to do with
right answers. The Legal Realists doubted that there were such things
as right answers; but the skepticism surely went beyond this school of
thought. What was training all about? It was all a matter of clever
arguments. It was, in short, training in how to score points
effectively-or, if you will, how to manipulate legal concepts and
propositions most cleverly. A good lawyer was quick and adroit; a
good lawyer was able to think on her feet; a good lawyer was able to
argue either side of a contested question.
This was certainly the assumption that governed legal education
when I was in law school. It was the point of the merciless Socratic
water torture that was prevalent then. Law school has, it seems to me,
become more humane since those good old days, but I see little or no
change in the underlying ethos. The good lawyer can make an
argument on any side of any issue, any client, any cause, and do it
32. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of
American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN
AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983).
33. See the survey in ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE

LAW xiii-xvii, 343-422 (1921).
34. Id. at 380.
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well. But if a good lawyer can do this, so can a good judge. A good
judge can write an opinion saying the law is on the side of A, B, or
anybody.
There are, of course, many other changes in legal education over
the last fifty years. Law schools have opened their doors to more
clinical training, more policy discussion, more economics, more
history, even a tad more sociology. It is arguable whether this stuff is
well done or whether there is enough of it (or in some cases, too
much). But I cannot see that it or anything else represents a
regression. The good old days in fact were terrible-narrow, meanspirited, deliberately and defiantly ignorant of the world.
Of course even during the heyday of Langdell or of Legal
Formalism, we should be skeptical, as I have suggested, about the
actual thought-processes of judges. It may be a mistake to take what
they said at face value-all those pious claims about the neutrality of
the law, about being bound by precedent, and so on. In the end, it
hardly matters whether the judges were true believers in formal
rationality, or true believers in laissez faire, or whatever. They may
have merely responded like Pavlov's dogs; they salivated when the
parties dished up before them some fact situation, some argument,
some principle that a person of their backgrounds, inclinations,
training, and temperament was likely to respond to. And liberal
judges of, say, the 1950s were in a way no different.
What role does legal education play in shaping the way judges
think and the way they do justice? There is a chicken and egg
problem here. Students, like judges, respond to certain lines of
reasoning and reject others. But much of this probably depends on
what kind of people they were, their backgrounds and personalities,
before they ever got to law school. How much is a product of
socialization inside law school is a question not easy to answer. And
the professors, after all, are themselves only former students placed in
front of a class. They are, of course, not a random sample of former
students.
Nobody could be against reforming or improving legal education,
at least not out loud. But how should we improve it? My personal
preferences (unlikely to be realized) would not, alas, go in the
direction I think Richard Markovits is suggesting. I would like to see
more real skills training-training in what lawyers actually do; and I
would like to see more study of the context in which legal systems
operate. This means going for the history, sociology, and
anthropology of law in a fairly big way. I would include the empirical
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and theoretical parts of economics as well, though I would like to
purge it of its tendency to look for right answers. Whether my own
program would have much impact on the legal profession or on the
judges is pretty dubious, but I would be willing to give it a try. At
least it would give students a better and, at the same time, more
practical education. I am, as I said, not very interested in taking legal
argument seriously. But social justice through better understanding of
the world in which the legal system lives and works -this I would take
seriously indeed.

